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Under the rubric of a "fathers' rights" movement, a backlash
is brewing against legislative advancements that protect women
and children from the men who beat and mistreat them.1 The
movement's rhetoric often embraces the moderate-sounding goals
of ensuring equal protection for fathers under the law.
2 Most
fathers' rights groups are, however, actively pursuing much
broader and more radical attacks on domestic violence, divorce,
custody, and child support laws by arguing that these laws
discriminate against men.
3
Booth v. Hvass4 illustrates one legal tactic of the fathers'
rights movement. In Booth, several men brought a suit in federal
court challenging certain Minnesota laws that fund services and
shelters for victims of domestic violence. 5 The Plaintiffs claimed
that the laws violate Equal Protection guarantees because they
provide funding to assist battered women but not to assist
* J.D. expected 2004, University of Minnesota. B.A. 1994, cum laude, Alma
College. This Article is dedicated to Walter Garrett, for perfecting the art of
fatherhood, and to Mark Salisbury, a model grandfather. I thank Betty Salisbury
and Sally, Tracy and Kristina Garrett for unconditional love. I am grateful for the
daily inspiration, encouragement, and technical assistance of Molly Dragiewicz,
Lauren Hancock, Hansem Dawn Kim, and countless additional friends and
mentors. I also appreciate the editorial assistance of Brendan Flaherty and the
Board and Staff of Law and Inequality. Finally, I thank the legislators, lawyers,
and domestic abuse shelter and service providers working to help families live free
from violence.
1. See infra Part I.A. (discussing the fathers' rights movement).
2. See infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (describing the general perception
of the fathers' rights movement).
3. See infra notes 23-39 and accompanying text (describing the goals and tactics
of the fathers' rights movement).
4. No. 00-1672 MJD/JGL, 2001 WL 1640141 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2001), affd, 302
F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 883 (2003). See infra Part II.B.
(discussing the Booth Equal Protection challenge to Minnesota's domestic violence
statutes).
5. Booth, 2001 WL 1640141, at *1.
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battered men.6 The Plaintiffs brought the suit ostensibly as male
citizens left unprotected by the statute; 7 however, each Plaintiff
belongs to one or more of the fathers' rights organizations
promoting the outright elimination of domestic violence statutes
and other family and child protection laws.
8
The district court dismissed the Booth case with prejudice,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari. 9 Because the resolution of the case turned
on issues of standing, the merits of the complaint, including the
Equal Protection questions, were not addressed. 10 In the event
that the fathers' rights groups involved with Booth identify a male
who has been denied domestic violence services in Minnesota,
these same issues are likely to come before the court.
This Note has two objectives: first, to illuminate the fathers'
rights movement and examine why it poses a credible threat to
domestic violence and other family laws; and second, to consider
the movement's discrimination claims against domestic violence
laws in particular and demonstrate how the Booth Equal
Protection challenges will ultimately fail. Part I surveys the
fathers' rights movement and examines the Supreme Court's
treatment of sex-based classifications." Part II describes the
Minnesota domestic violence statutes and the Equal Protection
challenges leveled by the Booth Plaintiffs.' 2 Part III examines the
merits of the Booth arguments under current Equal Protection
jurisprudence. 13 This Note concludes that Minnesota's domestic
violence laws would survive such judicial scrutiny. This Note also
highlights the importance of identifying and understanding the
fathers' rights movement as a whole, as well as the need to
appreciate its broader implications for domestic violence and
family laws.
6. Id. at *2.
7. See id. at *3.
8. See infra note 97 and accompanying text (describing the organizational
affiliations of the Plaintiffs involved in the Booth litigation).
9. Booth, 2001 WL 1640141, at *1, afrd, 302 F.3d 849, 854, cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.
883. See infra notes 102-106 and accompanying text (describing judicial treatment
of the case).
10. Booth, 2001 WL 1640141, at *2-3. See infra notes 102-106 and accompanying
text.
11. See infra notes 14-64 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 65-123 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 124-194 and accompanying text.
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I. THE CONTEXT FOR BOOTH'S EQUAL PROTECTION
CHALLENGE
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE FATHERS' RIGHTS
MOVEMENT
The Boston Globe modestly describes the fathers' rights
movement 14 as "a passionate but controversial campaign led by
those who believe the courts are biased toward women in custody
proceedings and domestic violence cases." 15  The movement's
members are working to end what they consider to be the "abuse
by women" of current divorce, custody, and domestic violence
laws,16 and the judicial "assumption that children are usually
better off with their mothers."'
17
While the movement seems to be more focused on the local
level,18  some of the movement's leaders are increasingly
14. It is important to distinguish between those organizations claiming to
represent fathers' rights (the focus of this Note) and organizations representing
fathers' interests. While linguistically they may sound similar or related, a real and
definite difference exists in the organizational missions of each movement. Groups
representing the interests of fathers may work on initiatives that educate fathers
about the responsibilities of fatherhood, strengthen the positive role of fathers in
families, form divorced-dad support groups, or provide legitimate legal assistance
to fathers in contested divorce or child custody matters. See, e.g., Dads &
Daughters, at http://www.dadsanddaughters.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2003) (a
national education and advocacy nonprofit group); Minneapolis FATHER Project,
at http://www.ycb.org/fatherproject.asp (last visited April 4, 2003) (a local initiator
that promotes young fathers' development by providing connections to parenting
classes, educational services, career planning and employment). As this Note will
demonstrate, the fathers' rights movement is an organized campaign of politically-
motivated, anti-feminist men's groups working to eliminate what its members
consider to be pro-women or anti-men laws. See infra notes 14-39 and
accompanying text.
15. Joanna Weiss, In Governor's Race, A Declarer of Independence; Campaign
Style Earning Johnson Some Attention, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 2002, at B1. The
fathers' rights movement recently increased its visibility when a Pennsylvania
woman temporarily faced an injunction preventing her from having an abortion
after her boyfriend took her to court. See Amy Fagan, Judge Lifts Injunction on
Abortion, Dismisses Lawsuit, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2002, at A3, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Allnews File; Dahlia Lithwick, Dad's Sad, Mad: Too Bad,
SLATE, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2069132 (Aug. 7, 2002); Marie McCullough, Man
Loses Bid to Halt Abortion; A Judge Lifted an Injunction; The Ex-Boyfriend Will
Appeal, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 6, 2002, at Al, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Allnews File.
16. Weiss, supra note 15.
17. Peter Schworm, Fathers Want Rightful Role in Custody of Their Children,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 2002, at 9. See also Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers
Losing. A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determinations, 14
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 177 (1992) ('The demands of the movement are based
upon the premise that men are unfairly disadvantaged in custody litigation.").
18. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (describing state legislative
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influencing national policy. 19 For example, Wade Horn, former
president of the fathers' rights group National Fatherhood
Initiative (NFI), 2° was recently appointed Assistant Secretary for
Children and Families at the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services. 21 NFI founder Don Eberly is the former deputy
director of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives and is currently with the U.S. Agency for International
Development.
22
Specific legislative and legal targets vary among the
organizations, but most fathers' rights groups are primarily
concerned with what they perceive as discrimination against men
in the family law context. 23 The founder of one such group, the
Fathers' Rights & Equality Exchange (FREE),24 charges that child
custody cases, for example, are laced with "maternal bias" and
urges members "to work at correcting the imbalance which
[maternal bias] has perpetuated, just as is done with any other
discriminatory bias which has wronged the peoples of our
society." 25 The Separated Parenting Access and Resource Center
(SPARC), 26 another fathers' rights organization, states that it
advocates for custodial fathers because "far too many custodial
mothers see no value in the presence of fathers ... and some
actively work to sabotage any involvement. This psychological
warfare is a form of child abuse."
27
While FREE and SPARC often couch their mission
statements in relatively moderate and seemingly gender-neutral
terminology, other fathers' rights groups describe their goals using
proposals and litigatibn tools).
19. See Mary Leonard, Bush Pledges Funds for Fatherhood, BOSTON GLOBE, June
8, 2001, at A2 ("Leaders of the fatherhood initiative have been named to key
positions in Bush's administration.").
20. See National Fatherhood Initiative, at http://www.fatherhood.org (last visited
Mar. 26, 2003).
21. See Sometimes It's Hard To Be a Man, ECONOMIST, Dec. 22, 2001, at 32-33.
22. Dana Milbank, Karl Rove, Adding to His To-Do List, WASH. POST, June 25,
2002, at A17.
23. See, e.g., Alliance for Non-Custodial Parents Rights, at http://www.ancpr.org
(last visited Mar. 26, 2003); The Fathers' Rights and Equality Exchange, at
http://www.dadsrights.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2003); National Fatherhood
Initiative, supra note 20; National Congress for Fathers & Children, at
http://www.ncfc.net (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
24. See The Fathers' Rights and Equality Exchange, supra note 23.
25. Anne P. Mitchell, Equal Protection Under the Law?, at
http://www.deltabravo.net/custody/equal.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
26. See Separated Parenting Access and Resource Center, Welcome to SPARC, the
Separated Parenting Access & Resource Center, at




more expressive and incendiary language. Lowell Jaks, a member
of the Alliance for Non-Custodial Parents Rights, for example,
encourages members to support "paternity fraud" legislation 28
because the success of such laws may lead to the elimination of
what he considers "more intractable laws such as those on
retroactive modification (Bradley Amendment), Domestic Violence
and Custody laws[j which are abused wholesale across the
country, along with completely idiotic child support guidelines that
are destroying lives everyday."29  Another group, the Fathers'
Rights Foundation, provides "free fathers rights litigation aides"
on its website and encourages men to fight against "false
allegations" of domestic violence and child abuse.30 In this same
vein, fathers' rights attorney Ronald Isaacs sells a "defense kit" for
fathers that "have been falsely accused of child abuse by an ex-
wife or girlfriend," ostensibly because these women use false
allegations "to exert pressure against the father in a custody
litigation."
3'
Postings to various online fathers' rights chatrooms,
discussion lists and listservs reveal additional targets of the
movement. 32 In one such posting, fathers' rights leader Bill Wood
28. "Paternity fraud legislation" is the generic title given to state legislative
proposals that allow ex-husbands and unmarried fathers to end child support
obligations using DNA proof that they are not the biological fathers of the children
receiving the support. See Martin Kasindorf, Men Wage Battle on 'Paternity
Fraud,' USA TODAY, Dec. 3, 2002, at A3 (reporting on the paternity fraud
movement and describing the eleven state paternity laws currently in effect);
Robert E. Pierre, States Consider Laws Against Paternity Fraud; Child Advocates
Worry About Effects, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2002, at A3 (discussing various state
paternity fraud proposals and "presumption of fatherhood" laws).
29. Posting of Lowell Jaks, ancpr@ancpr.org, to http://www.ancpr.org, Finally, an
Opportunity To Strike Back Effectively! (June 2, 2002), Ancpr-newsletter Archives,
at http://www.ancpr.org/recentnewsletters.htm. Jaks does not provide specific
examples of such "intractable" domestic violence, custody, and child support laws.
Id. However, his mention of the Bradley Amendment refers to the 1986
amendment to the Social Security Act, which bars the retroactive modification of
child support orders. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9) (2002). See generally J. Eric
Smithburn, Removing Nonconforming Child Support Payments from the Shadow of
the Rule Against Retroactive Modification: A Proposal for Judicial Discretion, 28 J.
FAM. L. 43, 43 (1990) (discussing the effect of the Bradley Amendment on
"questions concerning credit requests for nonconforming support payments").
30. Fathers' Rights Foundation, Dads' & Fathers'Rights Courtroom Tips Page, at
http://www.courttips.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
31. Ronald L. Isaacs, The False Claims of Child Abuse Defense Kit, at
http://www.dadslawyer.com/CHILDABUSEKIT (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
32. Because the Internet has become an important tool for mobilizing grassroots
efforts, and because it is a cheap and effective tool to reach people interested in a
particular cause, organizational websites and chatrooms are a critical source of
information on the fathers' rights movement. See, e.g., Mary R. Anderlik & Mark
A. Rothstein, DNA-Based Identity Testing and the Future of the Family: A Research
2003]
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insists "[i]t has been quiet for TOO LONG with the Fathers'
groups. ... It's time to 'ramp it up' again. And I mean RAMP IT
UP!"33 In an example of what he means by "ramp it up," Mr. Wood
encourages readers to spread the movement's message about
domestic violence:
October is "Domestic Violence" month. We need to start a two-
prong message about the domestic violence FRAUD, a) how
the courts commit domestic violence against children and
fathers EVERY SINGLE DAY, and b) how the courts RAPE
fathers for "fun and profit" using STOLEN taxpayer (VAWA)
funds to destroy them! If you have a personal Domestic
Violence HORROR STORY (abused restraining order, false
claims, you were hit but went to jail, etc.), CONTACT YOUR
LOCAL PAPERS IMMEDIATELY!!
34
The Booth v. Hvass lawsuit illustrates a practical application
of Mr. Wood's call to arms.35 The introduction to a web-based
index of motion papers filed in Booth states that the "purpose of
this suit is to cut off the main source of public money which fuels
sexist bias against men in our family court system."36 Elsewhere
on the website are claims that Minnesota domestic violence
legislation has resulted in "a well funded attack on the natural
rights and personal dignity of fathers and the accelerated
destruction of the traditional family structure."37 Grounded in the
father's rights ideology, 38 the legal action led by Mr. Booth and his
fellow Plaintiffs sought nothing less than the elimination of
Agenda, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 215, 221 (2002) (stating that fathers' rights
organizations "have high visibility due to their presence on the World Wide Web ....
Men who experience some trigger event will readily find a template for how to
understand and respond to their predicament").
33. Posting of Bill Wood, to http://forum.fathermag.com/childcustody/004/forum,
All Quiet with Fathers for Too Long! (Sept. 14, 2002), at
http://forum.fathermag.com/child-custody/004/forum/messages/129748.shtml.
34. Id. Rather than dismissing Mr. Wood as a member of a fringe group whose
positions yield no real influence, it is important to note that Mr. Wood co-authored
a statement on the record for the Child Support and Fatherhood Proposals Hearing
before the House Committee on Ways and Means Subcommittee on Human
Resources. See Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Human
Resources, 107th Congress, Child Support and Fatherhood Proposals, Statement of
Bill Wood, and Jay Gell, Children's Legal Foundation, Charlotte, North Carolina,
at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
35. See infra Part II.B. (describing the Booth case and the Plaintiffs' fathers'
rights affiliations).
36. Legal Action Committee, Minnesota's Battered Women's Act Challenged, at
http://www.thebestisp.com/-sbooth/BWA%20index.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
37. Legal Action Committee, Domestic Violence - Challenging the Minnesota
Battered Women's Act, at
http://www.thebestisp.com/-sbooth/Domestic%20Violence.htm (May 2001).
38. See infra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing the fathers' right
affiliations of the Booth Plaintiffs).
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Minnesota's domestic violence statutes. 39
B. EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO SEX-
BASED CLASSIFICATIONS
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
states "nor shall any State ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 40  The clause
prohibits state governments from treating similarly situated
individuals differently. 4 1 The first issue in any Equal Protection
challenge, therefore, is to determine whether a government
classification is based upon a real difference between the classes,
such that the different treatment is justified under the
circumstances being addressed by the government.
42
The Supreme Court has held that some classifications are so
severely suspect that they require a strict and exacting scrutiny.
43
For example, because the Fourteenth Amendment was originally
adopted to protect freed slaves, 44 governmental distinctions based
on race are considered inherently suspect and automatically
trigger a strict judicial review of the classification. 45 Under this
39. See Booth v. Hvass, No. 00-1672 MJD/JGL, 2001 WL 1640141, at *1 (D. Minn.
Aug. 13, 2001) (seeking declaratory judgment that the Minnesota statutes
appropriating funds to "emergency shelters for battered women, and support
services for 'battered women and domestic abuse victims and their children' are
unconstitutional).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
41. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)
(stating that the clause "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike").
42. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (explaining that the clause allows
States to treat different classes differently but "does, however, deny to States the
power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a
statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the
objective of that statute"). See also Rachel K. Alexander, Nguyen v. INS: The
Supreme Court Rationalizes Gender-Based Distinctions in Upholding an Equal
Protection Challenge, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 789, 806 (2002) (discussing Reed as
standing for the prohibition of "the classification of persons based on criteria
entirely unrelated to a statute's objective").
43. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (stating
that a state action that "operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or
impinges upon a fundamental right ... requir[es] strict judicial scrutiny").
44. AILEEN MCCOLGAN, WOMEN UNDER THE LAW: THE FALSE PROMISE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 35 (2000) (writing that the Equal Protection clause "was originally
intended solely to apply to black American men" but eventually "began to be
interpreted as extending beyond discrimination based on race to regulate, more
generally, governmental classifications between people"). See also Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women's Equality, 90 CAL. L. REV. 735, 742 (2002)
(writing that "[e]qual protection law was the creature of slavery, the central
American equality issue").
45. See Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) ("Racial
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strict scrutiny standard, a racial classification will almost always
be found unconstitutional.
46
A classification using non-suspect classes, such as age47 or
wealth, 48 is subject to a much less rigorous review. 49 In these
cases, so long as the classification has some rational basis and
furthers a legitimate government objective, the courts will
generally uphold the governmental distinction.
50
The Court initially used this relaxed rational basis standard
to uphold sex-based classifications. 51 Over time, however, the
Court increasingly viewed these sex-based distinctions as founded
more on unsubstantiated stereotypes about men or women than on
some real difference between the sexes. 52 Yet, because there are
many contexts in which men and women are not similarly
situated, 53 the Court has refrained from uniformly raising sex-
and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most
exacting judicial examination.").
46. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (stating that race is "so seldom relevant to
the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such
considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy ... and will be
sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest").
47. See Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (applying
rational basis to uphold a mandatory retirement statute).
48. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 24 C'[A]t least where wealth is involved, the Equal
Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages.").
49. See id. at 2 (holding that a strict scrutiny test "is reserved for cases involving
laws that operate to the disadvantage of suspect classes").
50. See id. at 55 ("The constitutional standard under the Equal Protection Clause
is whether the challenged state action rationally furthers a legitimate state
purpose or interest.") (citations omitted).
51. See Lee Schottenfeld, The Fate of Separate But Equal in the Athletic Arena, 10
U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 649, 656 (2002). Schottenfeld cites early examples of the
mere rationality test as employed by the Court to uphold sex-based classifications
in Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (upholding a statute denying women a
license to practice law), Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding a statute
exempting women from serving on juries), and Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948) (upholding a statute excluding women from tending bar unless she was the
wife or daughter of the bar owner). Schottenfeld, supra, at 656-57.
52. See Schottenfeld, supra note 51, at 657 (writing that when rational basis
review was the standard of review for sex-based classifications, "stereotypical
generalizations provided the justification for restricting the spheres of life of which
women could be a part").
53. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001) ("Fathers and mothers are not
similarly situated with regard to the proof of biological parenthood."); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78 (1981) ("Men and women, because of the combat
restrictions on women, are simply not similarly situated for purposes of a draft or
registration for a draft."); Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S.
464, 471 (1981) ("[Y]oung men and young women are not similarly situated with
respect to the problems and the risks of sexual intercourse."); Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) ("Male and female line officers in the Navy are
not similarly situated with respect to opportunities for professional service.").
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based distinctions as suspect classifications.54  The Court has
instead discussed sex-based classifications as "quasi-suspect"55 and
fashioned an intermediate scrutiny standard of judicial review for
cases dealing with these distinctions. 56 Under the intermediate
scrutiny standard, the classification must serve an important
governmental objective and must be substantially related to that
objective.
57
Since the Constitution does not specifically address sex-based
distinctions, the Court's early development of appropriate judicial
scrutiny for such classifications "was difficult and tortuous."58 In
fact, the Court did not start seriously considering "legislation
providing dissimilar treatment for similarly situated women and
men [until] the early 1970s."59 However, once the Court began to
reject government objectives that reinforce 'archaic and overbroad
generalizations' about men and women, the intermediate scrutiny
standard for sex-based classifications began to take shape.
60
54. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("Subsequent to Frontiero, the Court has declined to hold that sex is a suspect
class.") (citation omitted). See also Heather L. Stobaugh, The Aftermath of United
States v. Virginia: Why Five Justices are Pulling in the Reins on the "Exceedingly
Persuasive Justification," 55 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1756 (2002) ("It is no secret that
the current Supreme Court is split about whether gender is a suspect class.").
55. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 325 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (labeling women and
illegitimate children as "quasi-suspect" classes).
56. See Craig, 429 U.S. 190 (holding that a statutory ban on the sale of 3.2% beer
to males under the age of twenty-one and to females under the age of eighteen was
a violation of equal protection for males aged eighteen to twenty).
57. Id. at 197 ("To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish
that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."). See also
MCCOLGAN, supra note 44, at 36 (detailing the Court's application of intermediate
scrutiny to review a statutory scheme).
58. Sullivan, supra note 44, at 741. Sullivan writes that a "lack of explicit
constitutional text mandating women's equality" caused problems for the Court
because "in adapting the law of race discrimination for sex discrimination, the
Court faced certain analogical crises." Id. at 742.
59. Sandra Day O'Connor, Women and the Constitution: A Bicentennial
Perspective, in WOMEN, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 5, 12 (Naomi B. Lynn ed.,
1990). Justice O'Conner notes that the first time "the Court found a state law
discriminating against women to be unconstitutional was ... more than 100 years
after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
60. Craig, 429 U.S. at 198-99 (citing cases holding that such generalizations did
not justify gender classifications and noting that "increasingly outdated
misconceptions concerning the role of females in the home rather than in the
'marketplace and world of ideas' were rejected as loose-fitting characterizations
incapable of supporting state statutory schemes that were premised upon their
accuracy") (citations omitted). See also Alexander, supra note 42, at 815
(discussing the Court's rejection of "[t]he weak congruence between gender and any
gender-based generalization"); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some
Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 151, 154
20031
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As more sex-based classifications are challenged under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court continues to define the exact
contours of the intermediate scrutiny standard.61  In a recent
decision, the Court seemed to make it more difficult for sex-based
classifications to pass intermediate scrutiny when it held that
governments must also have an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for these distinctions.62 The precise meaning of this
holding is still under debate,63 but the language seems to require
that the government must show "not merely a substantial
relationship to important government interests," but also "an
'exceedingly persuasive justification' for its gender
discrimination.
64
II. BOOTH'S EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS AGAINST
THE MINNESOTA DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STATUTES
A. THE MINNESOTA DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
STATUTES
The statutes challenged by the Booth Plaintiffs are in the
Crime Victims chapter of the Minnesota Statutes. 65 The term
(1992) ("As a practical matter, what the Court did was strike down sex-based
classifications that were premised on the old breadwinner-homemaker, master-
dependent dichotomy.").
61. See R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review under the Equal Protection Clause
and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The "Base Plus
Six" Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225 (2002)
(discussing the various applications and standards of Equal Protection scrutiny).
62. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) ("Parties who seek to
defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly
persuasive justification' for that action."). See also Kelso, supra note 61, at 238
(2002) (discussing how the Virginia language seemed to heighten the usual
standard of intermediate scrutiny); Schottenfeld, supra note 51, at 672 ("This
phrase adds new meaning to the standard by allowing it to take on its own identity,
above and beyond that of the intermediate standard.").
63. Compare Virginia, 518 U.S. at 566-603 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the
exceedingly persuasive justification phrase as "amorphous" and "vacuous," and
generally discussing the negative implications of the majority's holding), with
Lawrence G. Sager, Of Tiers of Scrutiny and Time Travel: A Reply to Dean
Sullivan, 90 CAL. L. REV. 819, 822 (2002) (considering the "exceedingly persuasive
justification" phrase "a more radical doctrinal change"), with Stobaugh, supra note
54, at 1755 (discussing the Court's subsequent misgivings regarding the phrase).
64. See Kelso, supra note 61, at 238.
65. See MINN. STAT. §§ 611A.31-.375 (2000). "Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions,
there is no one law entitled the 'Minnesota Battered Women's Act;' rather, there is
a series of statutes which, taken as a whole, provides a mechanism for the dispersal
of federal and state funds to local programs that assist victims of domestic
violence." Booth v. Hvass, No. 00-1672 MJD/JGL, 2001 WL 1640141, at *1 (D.
Minn. Aug. 13, 2001).
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"battered woman" is defined in the chapter as "a woman who is
being or has been victimized by domestic abuse."66 The chapter's
subsections regarding battered women also refer to victims of
domestic abuse more generally.67 This treatment is consistent
with the gender-neutral definitions of "domestic abuse" as codified
in a separate collection of statutes titled the Domestic Abuse Act.
68
The Domestic Abuse Act defines "domestic abuse" as physical
harm, bodily injury or assault, or the infliction of fear thereof, or
terroristic threats, criminal sexual conduct, or interference with
an emergency call "if committed against a family or household
member by a family or household member."69 The Domestic Abuse
Act does not draw distinctions between the sexes.
70
Similar to the other subsections of the Crime Victims
chapter, the subsections related to "battered women" provide that
the commissioner shall:
award grants to programs which provide emergency shelter
services to battered women and support services to battered
women and domestic abuse victims and their children. The
commissioner shall also award grants for training, technical
assistance, and for the development and implementation of
education programs to increase public awareness of the causes
of battering, the solutions to preventing and ending domestic
violence, and the problems faced by battered women and
domestic abuse victims.
71
Throughout the crime victims' subsections, the statutes
incorporate the Domestic Abuse Act's definitions.7 2 As a result,
the provisions apply to both men and women in all matters except
that shelter grants are limited to those programs which provide
emergency shelter to battered women. 73 The subsections of the
Crime Victims chapter addressing "Shelter Facility Per Diem
Payments"74 further define "shelter facilities" eligible to receive
payments under the per diem program as facilities designed "for
the purpose of providing food, lodging, safety, and 24-hour
66. MINN. STAT. § 611A.31, subd. 2.
67. See MINN. STAT. §§ 611A.31-.375.
68. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2000).
69. Id. at subd. 2(a).
70. See generally MINN. STAT. § 518B.01. The only reference to a person's sex in
the Domestic Abuse Act is in § 518B.01, subd. 2(b)(6), which defines "family or
household members" in part as "a man and woman if the woman is pregnant and
the man is alleged to be the father." Id. All other terms are sex- and gender-
neutral. Id.
71. MINN. STAT. § 611A.32, subd. 1.
72. See MINN. STAT. §§ 611A.31-.375.
73. See MINN. STAT. §§ 611A.31-.361.
74. MINN. STAT. §§ 611A.37-.375.
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coverage for battered women and their children."75
The laws regarding battered women as crime victims were
originally passed in 1977.76 The legislative history shows that
prior to passing the law, the legislature considered whether men
and women were similarly situated as victims of domestic
violence.7 7 After convening several investigative hearings on the
subject, the legislature ultimately decided that the sexes were not
similarly situated in this context.78 The Booth Plaintiffs included
in their Amended Complaint select transcripts from the Minnesota
House of Representatives' floor debate regarding this legislation.
79
These transcripts show that the Minnesota Legislature rejected a
gender-neutral approach for three main reasons: they found no
evidence that men were in need of domestic violence shelters, they
found that the problem of battered women and children was more
pressing and widespread than the problem of battered men, and
they determined that the funding need to address domestic
violence was extremely limited.
80
The legislative transcript shows that the legislators rejected
an amendment that would have changed the word "women" to
"persons" throughout the legislation. 81 As the legislators debated
the amendment, the consensus appeared to be "that changing this
to 'persons' would draw away the ability to deal with an extremely
serious problem that exists for women."8 2  Several legislators
stated that inquiries were specifically made as to whether there
was a need for shelters for men.83 The responses from people
working in the domestic violence field all seemed to comport with
75. See MINN. STAT. § 611A.37, subd. 4.
76. MINN. STAT. §§ 611A.31-.375.
77. See Amended Complaint, Exhibit 3, Booth v. Hvass, No. 00-1672 MJD/JGL,
2001 WL 1640141 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2001) (No. 00-1672), available at
http://rkids.org/BWADocuments/le%20Exhibit%203%20MN%20House /2ODebate.
doc (last visited April 4, 2003) (transcription of May 20, 1977, House of
Representatives' floor debate considering an amendment to delete "women" after
the word "battered" in the interest of gender neutrality). See also infra note 97 and
accompanying text.




82. See id. at 9 (remarks of Mrs. Kahn). Mrs. Kahn goes on to report that the
legislature was then considering "a problem that has not been met in society which
is an extremely serious problem and evidence presented in all committee[s] has
said there is not a corresponding problem for men." Id. at 12.
83. See id. at 3 (remarks of Mrs. Kahn), 14 (remarks of Mr. Randall) (discussing
reports by St. Paul police officers of the thousands of battered women cases they
had encountered compared to the virtual non-existence of battered men cases).
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the report of one police officer's statement that he had "never in all
his years seen a case of a battered man."8 4  In contrast, a
representative recalled the testimony of one battered women's
advocacy organization "that they have to turn away three women
for every one that they accept."85 As a result of multiple hearings
on the issue, the legislators ultimately decided that the sexes were
not similarly situated with respect to domestic violence, and that
the problem of battered women was more pressing and widespread
at that time.
8 6
The record also reflects the legislature's consideration of
evidence on how children are impacted by domestic violence.
8 7
Throughout the hearings, the legislators heard testimony that
children often experience violence along with the women, and that
children's interests would be served by providing shelters to
battered women.88 They indicated a desire for the language of the
statute to allow both women and their children to seek emergency
shelter as a family.
8 9
In addition, the legislature's decision was influenced by the
level of state funding that was available to address the issue of
domestic violence in the State. 90 The Council on the Economic
Status of Women, for example, held several hearings to consider
the financial implications of providing services to both male and
female victims of domestic violence. 91 The Council determined
that available resources were barely adequate to provide services
to battered women, and if funding was also provided for battered
men's programs, "it would spread those very thin resources much,
much thinner so that we could not begin to respond to this
problem."92  A member of the Social Service Subcommittee of
Health and Welfare suggested that using already scarce resources
to also fund shelters for men "when we don't have the men to put
in the homes ... would be a shame and a crime."
93
84. See id. at 3 (remarks of Mrs. Kahn).
85. See id. at 17 (remarks of Mr. Sand).
86. See id. at 19 (recording of the vote on the amendment, "51 Aye's, 72 Nay's, the
amendment is not adopted").
87. See id. at 2 (remarks of Mr. McDonald), 3-4 (remarks of Mrs. Kahn), 8
(remarks of Mrs. Bergland), 10-14 (remarks of various speakers in debate
regarding children).
88. See id.
89. See id. at 8 (remarks of Mrs. Bergland).
90. See id. at 16-17 (remarks of Mr. Sand).
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 14-15 (remarks of Mr. Randall).
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The current language providing that emergency shelter
services grants pertain only to shelters serving battered women
was the result of a bill passed in the 2000 legislative session.
94
These changes altered certain references throughout the domestic
violence statutes from "battered women" to "domestic abuse
victims."95  In particular, the amendments changed section
611A.32 to read: "The commissioner shall award grants to
programs which provide emergency shelter services to battered
women and support services to battered women and domestic
abuse victims and their children."96  Thus, the only remaining
gender-specific language in Minnesota's domestic violence statutes
is the language providing emergency shelter service for battered
women's shelters.
B. BOOTH v. HVASS
In the fall of 2000, Scott Booth and several other fathers'
rights activists challenged Minnesota's domestic violence laws in
federal court.97 The Plaintiffs sought "a declaratory judgment that
the Minnesota statutory scheme for dispersing state and federal
funds to assist battered women and victims of domestic abuse is
unconstitutional."9 8  They claimed, inter alia, that the Battered
Women section of the Crime Victims chapter 99 "discriminates
against men in violation of the Equal Protection Clause ... by
facilitating the expenditure of millions of dollars to assist battered
women, but offering no money to assist battered males." 100  In
addition, the Plaintiffs sought to prohibit certain state department
94. 2000 Minn. Laws 445, art. 2 §§ 10-21.
95. Id.
96. See id. § 10 (emphasis indicates language added by the amendment).
97. See Amended Complaint at 1, Booth v. Hvass, No. 00-1672 MJD/JGL, 2001
WL 1640141 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2001) (No. 00-1672), available at
http://rkids.org/BWA_- Documents/1%20Complaint.doc (Oct. 17, 2000) [hereinafter
Amended Complaint]. The caption of the Amended Complaint lists among the
Plaintiffs various individual men forming the R-KIDS (Remember Kids in Divorce
Settlements) Legal Action Committee, the Men's Defense Association, and the
National Coalition of Free Men, Twin Cities Chapter. Id. Each of these
organizations has a mission statement falling under the rubric of the fathers' rights
movement. See R-KIDS, at http://www.r-kids.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2003);
Men's Defense Association, at http://www.mensdefense.org (last visited Mar. 26,
2003); National Coalition of Free Men, at http://www.ncfm.org (last visited Mar. 26,
2003). See also supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text (discussing Plaintiffs'
organizational relationship with the fathers' rights movement).
98. Booth v. Hvass, 302 F.3d 849, 850 (8th Cir. 2002). See also infra notes 109-
123 and accompanying text (discussing specific claims contained in the Booth
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint).
99. MINN. STAT. §§ 611A.31-.375 (2000).
100. Booth, 302 F.3d at 850.
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commissioners "from spending funds under, or promoting the
objectives of, the domestic abuse statutes."'' 1
The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota found
that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the Equal Protection
claim and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 10 2 The
Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal asserting taxpayer standing to
challenge the spending of public funds under the domestic abuse
statutes "because the domestic abuse statutes unlawfully
discriminate against men based upon their sex."'10 3 The Eighth
Circuit rejected the Plaintiffs' argument and affirmed the
dismissal, holding that "[a] taxpayer whose tax money is used in a
discriminatory manner suffers no injury under the Equal
Protection Clause unless and until an expenditure facilitates
discrimination against him or her."'0 4 The court further held that
the appellants lacked "taxpayer standing to challenge state
expenditures to benefit battered women under the Equal
Protection Clause."'105 In January 2003, the Supreme Court denied
the Plaintiffs' petition for writ of certiorari.
0 6
Although the district court dismissed the case before a
hearing on its merits, the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint detailed
the underlying Equal Protection claims involved in the lawsuit.
10 7
While not clearly labeled as such, the Plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint contained claims that the Minnesota domestic violence
laws are facially discriminatory, purposefully discriminatory, and
101. Id. at 851. The state department commissioners named in the case were
various officials responsible for overseeing the state's domestic violence
programming and funding: Sheryl Ramstad Hvass, Commissioner of Corrections;
Michael O'Keefe, Commissioner of Human Services; Charles R. Weaver, Jr.,
Commissioner of Public Safety; and Christine Jax, Commissioner of Children,
Families, and Learning. Id. at 850. The Domestic Abuse Project, Central
Minnesota Task Force on Battered Women, and Lakes Crisis Center, all providers
of service to victims of domestic violence, intervened on behalf of the Defendants.
Id. at 851.
102. Booth v. Hvass, No. 00-1672 MJD/JGL, 2001 WL 1640141 at *2 (D. Minn.
Aug. 13, 2001). The District Court found that the "Plaintiffs failed to meet both the
constitutional and prudential requirements for standing," leaving the court
"without jurisdiction over this complaint." Id. at *5.
103. Booth, 302 F.3d at 851.
104. See id. at 854.
105. See id.
106. Booth, 123 S. Ct. 883 (2003).
107. See Amended Complaint, supra note 97, at 1. The website from which this
copy of the Amended Complaint may be obtained is hosted by Booth Plaintiff Scott
Booth and the R-KIDS Legal Action Committee, and contains links to copies of
various court documents filed in the District Court, Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, and Supreme Court proceedings. See R-KIDS, at
http://rkids.orgBWADocuments (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
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have discriminatory effects against men.108
1. FACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY
The Amended Complaint discussed statutory language that,
according to the Plaintiffs, clearly draws impermissible
distinctions between men and women. 09 The Plaintiffs asserted
that the Minnesota statutes contain sex-based classifications that
"subsidize battered women's shelters, [but not] like or comparable
facilities for men."'1 0 The Plaintiffs claimed that the statutes rest
on the statutory premise that men are the cause of all or
.'virtually all domestic violence, and ordains as public policy
that women and only women need to be protected against
domestic violence, and that funds under the said Act may be
spent for the benefit of women but not men. By virtue of its
express language and legislative history, [the statutes] cannot
be read to avoid discrimination against men on account of sex.
The most recent amendments to [the statutes], including
especially the nondiscrimination clause ... make clearer then
[sic] ever that discrimination is allowed against men but not
against women."'
Based on these assertions, the Plaintiffs concluded that the




The Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint cited to legislative history
that shows the state's discriminatory intent. 113 The records of
both the Minnesota Senate and House of Representatives
document motions made to replace the word "women" with
"persons" throughout the original legislation." 4 The motions were
defeated in both houses.1'
5
108. See infra notes 109-123 and accompanying text (detailing Plaintiffs' main
equal protection claims against the Minnesota domestic violence statutes).
109. Amended Complaint, supra note 97, at 19.
110. Id. at 9.
111. Id. at 19.
112. Id. at 21.
113. Id. at 15-19.
114. Id. at 16-17.
115. Id. at 16 (citing Journal of the Senate, May 12, 1977, 2176-78), 17 (citing
Journal of the House of Representatives, May 20, 1977, 3216-18). Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint Exhibit 3 is an untitled document that Plaintiffs presented as
the official "transcript of the said proceedings, including all remarks made during
the debate as preserved in the official records of the House of Representatives on
May 20, 1977." Id. at 18. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (describing the
Plaintiffs' exhibit of the legislative transcript). This Note will assume, for purposes
of consistency, that the legislative transcript provided by the Plaintiffs is the
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The Plaintiffs also cited "published empirical studies"
showing that "women initiate and carry out physical assaults on
their partners as often as men do." 116 The Amended Complaint
included as Exhibit Four an annotated list of 117 scientific reports,
which purportedly document "approximately equal rates of
domestic violence for men and for women." 7 While the Plaintiffs
did not articulate the argument, they appeared to offer this
evidence to show that the 1977 Minnesota Legislature
purposefully ignored evidence that men and women were similarly
situated with respect to domestic violence, and that men had a
need for, but were not receiving, access to domestic violence
shelters.
3. DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS
The Booth Plaintiffs passionately complained that the
Minnesota domestic violence statutes have discriminatory effects
against men. 18 For example, although the Plaintiffs did not claim
that the domestic violence statutes require shelter funding
recipients to publish specific literature, the Plaintiffs alleged that
these shelters use state funding to publish "sexist hate literature
against men" that encourage the disproportionate use of protection
orders and other legal remedies against men. 119  In essence,
Plaintiffs argued that by allowing domestic violence shelters to use
statutory funding at their own discretion, the statutes in effect
facilitate and encourage discrimination against men.120
The Amended Complaint also contained allegations that the
"cumulative effect" of the Minnesota domestic abuse statutory
scheme "is the creation of a prejudicial atmosphere against men in
official record of the Minnesota Legislature's 1977 floor debate regarding this
legislation.
116. Amended Complaint, supra note 97, at 20.
117. Id. See Martin S. Fiebert, References Examining Assaults by Women on
Their Spouses or Male Partners: An Annotated Bibliography, at
http://www.csulb.edu/-mfiebert/assault.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2003) (the
document presented by Plaintiffs as Exhibit 4). It should be noted that of the "133
scholarly investigations ... which demonstrate that women are as physically
aggressive, or more aggressive, than men in their relationships with their spouses
or male partners" cited in this bibliography, most are from studies or analyses
published between 1980 and the present. Id. The only cited study that would have
been available to the Minnesota Legislature considering the battered women
legislation in 1977 is a 1963 examination of male and female aggression as
expressed in newspaper cartoons entitled "Male and female relations in the
American comic strip." Id.
118. Id. at 8-13.
119. Id. at 11.
120. Id. at 8-13.
2003]
Law and Inequality
general before the judiciary ... depriving them, because they are
men, of equal and impartial justice under law."'121 Consistent with
a discriminatory effect theory, the Plaintiffs contended that they
"and thousands of men like them, either have been or may be
personally prejudiced by the said cumulative effect of programs
and spending". 122  In concluding their argument that the
Minnesota domestic violence statutes violate the Equal Protection
Clause, the Plaintiffs claimed that the laws have "been zealously
implemented, resulting in the oppression of husbands, fathers, and
men in general."'
123
III. ARE FATHERS' RIGHTS A THREAT TO FAMILY LAW?
The fathers' rights movement is founded on the belief that
men face sex-based discrimination under current domestic violence
and family law legislation across the country. 124 It is from this
premise that the movement is launching Equal Protection
challenges to dismantle such legislation.125 Similar to the claims
made by the Plaintiffs in Booth v. Hvass, the movement is arguing
that these laws treat similarly situated individuals differently.
126
It is important to understand these Equal Protection challenges
because they were not resolved by Booth v. Hvass and are likely to
arise again either against the Minnesota domestic violence
statutes or against some other jurisdiction's domestic violence or
family law statutes. 127 While the Minnesota statutes are likely to
survive the specific challenges in Booth,12 8 other states' laws may
not survive sex-based Equal Protection scrutiny. Legislators
would be well-advised to review their state's domestic violence and
family law statutes, and to cure any discrimination that may be
contained in or caused by these laws.
A. THE MINNESOTA STATUTES WOULD SURVIVE
EQUAL PROTECTION SCRUTINY
The Minnesota domestic violence statutes challenged in
121. Id. at 13.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 23.
124. See supra Part I.A. (discussing the father's rights movement).
125. Id.
126. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text (discussing specific complaints
of the father's rights movement).
127. See supra notes 102-106 and accompanying text (describing judicial
treatment of the case).
128. See infra Part III.A. (analyzing the Minnesota domestic violence statutes
under an Equal Protection intermediate scrutiny standard).
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Booth would likely survive an Equal Protection analysis. The
Booth Plaintiffs argued that the statutes contain sex-based
classifications, 129 which trigger an intermediate scrutiny standard
of review. 130 Under the current Equal Protection jurisprudence,
the State has to provide exceedingly persuasive justification
showing that any sex-based classifications are substantially
related to an important governmental objective. 13' Even using
only the Booth Plaintiffs' very own evidence, 13 2 Minnesota can
meet this burden and survive each of Booth's claims of
discrimination.
1. THE MINNESOTA STATUTES ARE JUSTIFIED IN
THEIR FACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Unlike suspect racial classifications, which rarely survive
judicial scrutiny, 133 textual sex-based distinctions have a less clear
judicial outcome. 134  Because the Court has held sex-based
classifications to be quasi-suspect, 35 the State must prove that the
sexes are not similarly situated in the context at issue,1 36 and that
the classifications are not based on stereotypes or generalizations
about the sexes. 137 A statute that draws a distinction between
men and women in its text will be upheld if the State can provide
exceedingly persuasive justification that the sex-based distinctions
are substantially related to an important governmental interest.
1 38
The Minnesota domestic violence statutes are generally
gender-neutral in language except where they provide funding for
emergency shelter services. 39 Section 611A.32 of the Minnesota
Statutes draws a sex-based distinction when it directs the award
of grants to programs providing "emergency shelter services to
129. See Booth v. Hvass, No. 00-1672 MJD/JGL, 2001 WL 1640141, at *1 (D.
Minn. Aug. 13, 2001).
130. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (describing the intermediate
scrutiny standard of judicial review for sex-based classifications).
131. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text (describing development of
judicial review of sex-based classifications).
132. See supra Part II.B.
133. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing race-based
classifications).
134. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (discussing classifications of
individuals).
137. See supra notes 52, 60 and accompanying text (discussing stereotypes and
generalizations about the sexes).
138. See supra notes 56-57, 62-64 and accompanying text.
139. See MINN. STAT. §§ 611A.31-.375 (2000). See also supra Part II.A.
(explaining the Minnesota domestic violence statutes).
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battered women."'140  The Booth Plaintiffs lodged a facial
discrimination claim against this provision alleging that the
classification subsidizes emergency shelter services for battered
women but not for similarly situated battered men.141  The
Plaintiffs argued that this statutory line "cannot be read to avoid
discrimination against men on account of sex."
i 42
However, applying the current intermediate scrutiny to the
emergency shelter services provision, a court would likely uphold
this sex-based classification because the State had an exceedingly
persuasively justification for drawing the distinction in order to
further an important governmental interest. When the Minnesota
Legislature initially considered the domestic violence legislation,
they made findings that established men and women were not
similarly situated with respect to being victims of domestic
violence. 143 According to the legislative debate, this determination
was not based on generalizations about women or men or domestic
violence overall, but on actual testimony and statistics provided in
several legislative hearings that showed an overwhelming need for
emergency shelters for women in particular. 144 Shelter providers
testified that they encountered numerous women who needed but
were denied emergency services because there were not enough
shelters available to them. 145  The legislative committees
specifically inquired as to whether there was a similar problem
among male victims of domestic violence.1 46  They found no
evidence of this and thereby determined that men and women
were not similarly situated in the context of domestic violence.
47
As demonstrated by these findings, the Legislature
determined that it was an important governmental objective to
respond to the pervasive needs of battered women who were
attempting to escape violence in their homes. 14a The legislation
was designed to meet a considered need and was substantially
related to that objective by providing grants to programs that aid
140. See MINN. STAT. § 611A.32.
141. See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text (describing Booth Plaintiffs'
facial discrimination claims).
142. Amended Complaint, supra note 97, at 19.
143. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Minnesota
Legislature's investigation into whether men and women were similarly situated
with respect to domestic violence).
144. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.




2. THE STATUTES ARE JUSTIFIED IN THEIR
PURPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION
Any purposeful discrimination in the Minnesota domestic
violence statutes is also exceedingly persuasively justified. In
their Equal Protection challenge, the Booth Plaintiffs relied on
both the legislative history and extrinsic scientific evidence to
show that the Minnesota Legislature purposefully discriminated
against men in designing the domestic violence statutes. 150 The
Plaintiffs specifically pointed to defeated proposals that would
have made the entire bill gender-neutral as evidence that the
legislators intended only women to benefit under the law. 151 The
Plaintiffs also presented a compilation of scientific reports
ostensibly documenting that men and women are in fact similarly
situated when it comes to domestic violence.
152
Even relying only the Plaintiffs' own evidence, however, the
State could survive an intermediate scrutiny standard of review
for discriminatory purpose. The gender-neutral amendment
debate that Plaintiffs cited to support their claims of purposeful
discrimination also supports the State's exceedingly persuasive
justification for defeating these amendments. 153  From. the
transcript provided by the Plaintiffs, it is apparent that the
legislators specifically considered making the statutory language
gender-neutral, 154 but rejected the amendments for three main
reasons: first, they did not find an immediate need for shelters
among men; 155 second, they took into account the interests of
children living in violent homes;' 56 and third, they understood the
limited funding options that were available for domestic violence
shelters.157
As established by the legislative debate, the Minnesota
149. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
150. See Amended Complaint, supra note 97, at 15-20. See also supra Part II.B.
(discussing the Booth Plaintiffs' arguments and evidence exhibited with their
Amended Complaint).
151. See id. at 16-17. See also supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text
(describing Booth Plaintiffs' use of the legislative transcript).
152. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text (describing Booth Plaintiffs'
scholarly studies exhibit).
153. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
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Legislature made repeated attempts to ascertain whether men and
women were similarly situated with respect to a need for shelter
from domestic violence. 158 The legislators heard no evidence of a
pressing need for any battered men's shelters, let alone to the
same degree of need for battered women's shelters. 159 Therefore, a
majority of the legislators agreed that creating a gender-neutral
statute would detract from their important objective to address the
critical need among women.160
In their inquiries regarding the extent of the domestic
violence problem among men and women, the legislators also
asked about the effect of domestic violence on children. 161 The
legislators found evidence that in situations where women are
victimized, children are also victimized. 62 In order to protect the
greatest number of domestic violence victims, the legislators
designed the statute in a way that allowed a woman and her
children to escape the violence together.163
The limited resources available to deal with the State's
domestic violence crisis was an additional factor in the
legislature's decision to defeat the gender-neutral proposal.
164
Legislative committees considered the fiscal consequences of
funding shelters for both men and women. 165 These legislators
found that there were barely enough resources available to fund
shelters. 166 Since the legislature had not found an urgent need for
battered men's shelters, 67 they determined that a gender-neutral
statute would detract too greatly from the funding necessary to
address the urgent need for battered women's shelters.
68
The Booth Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint also included as
evidence of discriminatory purpose a list of scientific reports
purportedly showing that men are victims of domestic violence at
equal rates with women. 169 However, even a cursory glance at the
list shows that not one of these studies of actual male and female
relationships was available to the Minnesota Legislature at the
158. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 81-82, 86 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
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time it was considering the original statute. 170 It would have been
difficult for Plaintiffs to prove that the Minnesota Legislature
purposefully ignored this evidence of similarly situated battered
men since these studies were not published at the time the
legislators enacted the domestic violence statutes.
Finally, any discriminatory purpose that can be found in the
1977 Legislature's original domestic violence legislation has either
been cured by the 2000 amendments or retains the original
exceedingly persuasive justification. The 2000 amendments
changed most of the legislation to accommodate domestic abuse
victims from both sexes. 17 1 Men and women who are similarly
situated as victims of domestic abuse are treated equally in the
statute when it comes to support services, domestic violence
training, technical assistance and education and public awareness
programs. 172 It is only in the award of grants to emergency
shelters that one sex appears to be favored over the other,173 and
this favor was created in response to the continuing direct and
critical need among that class of people.
17 4
3. THE STATUTES DO NOT HAVE DISCRIMINATORY
EFFECTS
In addition to their allegations of facial discrimination and
discriminatory purpose, the Booth Plaintiffs claimed that the
domestic abuse statutes collectively have the effect of
discriminating against all Minnesota men in several ways. 175 For
example, the Plaintiffs claimed that funding provided under the
statutes' educational provisions is used to publish literature that
discriminates against men.176 The Plaintiffs argued in particular
that this literature encourages the use of protection orders and
other legal remedies against men.177 According to the Plaintiffs,
the combination of this "sexist hate literature" and other programs
funded by the statutes create a prejudicial atmosphere before
170. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 71, 94-96 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text. See also supra Part III.A.1
(analyzing Booth Plaintiffs' facial discrimination claims).
175. See Amended Complaint, supra note 97, at 8-13. See also supra notes 118-
123 and accompanying text (describing Booth Plaintiffs' discriminatory effects
claims).
176. See Amended Complaint, supra note 97, at 11. See also supra notes 119-120
and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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courts1 78 because the literature allegedly presents men as the
cause of domestic violence and never as the victims.
179
A court applying intermediate scrutiny to the Minnesota
domestic violence statutes would likely find that any resulting
discriminatory effects against men are exceedingly persuasively
justified. The same reasons providing an exceedingly persuasive
justification for facial discrimination 8 0 allow the domestic violence
statutes to overcome the claim of discriminatory effects. The
statutes clearly provide that grants for support services, training,
technical assistance and education programs are gender-neutral
and shall address issues of domestic violence for both battered
women and all domestic abuse victims generally.1 81 Specifically,
the legislation provides funding for programs that "increase public
awareness of the causes of battering" and that provide "solutions
to preventing and ending domestic violence."1 82  Throughout
several hearings held by the Minnesota Legislature, the legislators
found that men and women were not similarly situated with
respect to domestic violence. 8 3 Despite this initial finding, the
current statutes providing funding for educational and support
programs are facially gender-neutral.5 4 The statutory funding of
programs that increase awareness of the causes of domestic
violence and that help victims seek shelter services or legal
remedies against their abusers is substantially related to the
Minnesota Legislature's objective of reducing the overall
occurrence of domestic violence, as well as their objective for
helping victims to escape violent circumstances. Any
discriminatory effect these programs have against men is
exceedingly persuasively justified because the Minnesota
Legislature found that women overwhelming outnumber men as
victims of domestic violence. 8 5
178. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
179. See Amended Complaint, supra note 97, at 11 (citing a manual, funded by
money through the state, which states nearly all domestic violence is inflicted by
men upon women).
180. See supra Part III.A.1.
181. See MINN. STAT. § 611A.32, subd. 1 (2000).
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
184. See MINN. STAT. §§ 611A.31-.375. See also supra notes 71-73, 94-96 and
accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
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B. THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING THE
FATHERS'RIGHTS MOVEMENT
While the Minnesota statutes would likely survive the Booth
Equal Protection challenge, it remains important to understand
the underlying arguments since similar claims may be brought in
other jurisdictions. Plaintiffs like those in Booth remain a
litigation threat to Minnesota's domestic violence family laws and
as well as and to other state and federal laws. 186 Members of the
fathers' rights movement nationwide are actively seeking grounds
for litigation and new legislation regarding domestic violence,
divorce, child support, and child protection laws. 8 7 In fact, the
websites and newsletters for fathers' rights organizations openly
call for members to enlist the media's assistance in spreading their
message. 188 And with monikers implying that the organizations
represent the legitimate interests of fathers in divorce and other
family law contexts, as well as their use of moderate language
when speaking publicly, these groups are starting to receive
national attention.
18 9
The fathers' rights organizations also pose a problem for men
who are seeking genuine legal assistance in their own domestic
issue proceedings. 190 Dispensing propaganda laced with technical
jargon, the fathers' rights groups' lawyer-like advice promotes
risky and possibly unlawful action. 19' Furthermore, by preying on
the frustrations of men in the midst of divorce and custody
disputes, the groups may convince vulnerable fathers that the
courts are actually biased against them and that they will never
win under the current legal standards. This could lead fathers
with legitimate claims to give up and forgo their day in court;
perhaps even encouraging illegal alternates, such as kidnapping,
to achieve a sense of justice.
Finally, the movement is gaining credibility with state and
federal legislators. While some of the fathers' rights leaders are
working their way into high-ranking federal positions,192 others
are concentrating their lobbying efforts at the state and local level
186. See supra Part I.A. (describing the fathers' rights movement).
187. See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text (discussing the goals and
tactics of the fathers' rights movement).
188. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
190. It is important to remember the difference between legitimate fathers'
interests organizations and the organizations promoting the subversive tactics of
the fathers' rights movement. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
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with moderate success. 193 With a receptive audience in both the
current presidential administration and in several state
legislatures, 194 it may only be a matter of time before the
movement convinces policymakers that domestic violence and
certain family law statutes are either wholly unconstitutional or
weighted too heavily against men, despite any empirical evidence
to the contrary. For that reason, legislators and advocates are
well-advised to seriously consider whether such laws should be
gender-neutral. If lawmakers find there is a reason for sex-based
classifications in family law matters, then this should be
supported with sound impartial evidence, statistics and specific
legislative findings.
CONCLUSION
The fathers' rights movement is certain to continue raising
sex-based discrimination challenges in its efforts to overturn
domestic violence, divorce and child custody legislation. Since
Booth v. Hvass did not address the merits of the Plaintiffs'
underlying Equal Protection claims, it is possible the court will
face these questions again. A man claiming to have been denied
emergency shelter services could litigate these claims with the
support of the fathers' rights movement and their agenda behind
him. While the Minnesota domestic violence statutes would likely
survive an intermediate judicial scrutiny, it is important to
understand the greater implications of the Booth challenges. An
appreciation of the fathers' rights movement's Equal Protection
arguments and motivations will help prepare policymakers and
advocates for the battles they are sure to face in the coming years.
193. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 19-22, 28 and accompanying text.
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